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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
-v.-

Case No.

JAMES L. HATCH and DELLA L.
HATCH,
Respondents.

8937

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
WHETHER SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD
BY THE STATE IN I'TS PROPRIETARY OR GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY.
POINT II.
WHETHER THE UTAH STATUTES REQUIRE A
RESERVATION OF MINERALS.
POINT III.
WHETHER UTAH LAW CONTROLS THE CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT TO BE GIVE·N TO UTAH
STATUTES AND THE AUTHORITY OR LACK OF AUTHORITY OF STATE OFFICERS.
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POINT IV.
WHETHER EXCHANGES NEED NOT BE OF
EQUIVALENT ESTATES BUT ONLY OF EQUIVALENT
VALUES.
POINT V.
WHETHER A RULE OF PROPERTY CAN BE
EVOLVED FROM PRIOR EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHETHER SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD
BY THE STATE IN ITS PROPRIETARY OR GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY.

In its initial brief, the appellant, State of Utah, in
reliance upon pertinent provisions of the State Constitution as interpreted in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58
Utah 418, 199 Pac. 670, asserts that school section lands
such as involved in this case are held by the state in trust
in its governmental capaci(c Respondents·· reply n1akes
the contrary contention that such lands are held by the
state in it~ proprietary capacit~~. The only authority
cited by respondents in support of their position is
Strand v. State, 16 "\Vash. ~d 107, 132 P. ~d 1011, where
it was stated in a suit against the state to quiet title to
certain "attached tidelands" that the "accepted rule is
that a state acts in its proprietary capacity when it undertakes to dispose of public lands" of that type.
-whatever the rule in \Vashington n1ay be with respect to "attached tidelands,'' that state follows a very
different rule with respect to school section lands.
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O'Brien v. Wilson, 51 Wash. 52, 97 Pac. 1115; State v.
City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 602, 107 Pac. 827, Gustavenson v. Dwyer, 83 Wash. 303, 145 Pac. 458. The foregoing
cases constitute the settled law of Washington with
respect to school section lands held by the state in its
governmental capacity. In fact, O'Bri'en v. Wilson, supra.,
was cited and relied upon by this Court in announcing
the same rule for Utah in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore,
supra.
The two United States Supreme Court cases cited
by respondents, United States v. California & Oregon
Land Co., 148 U.S. 31, 13 Sup. Ct. 458, and Uniited States
v. Dallas Military Road Company, 148 U.S. 49, 13 Sup.
Ct. 465, are both lifted from the Strand case. The cases
concern technical rulings with respect to the sufficiency
of pleadings; they in no way involved the subject of
school sections or the issue of whether the government
was acting in its governmental capacity. When the interest of the United States in lands claimed by it in its
governmental capacity has been challenged, the United
States Supreme Court has not hesitated to declare that
such lands are immune from attack based upon principles
of laches, estoppel, adverse possession, or negligence of
government agents. As stated in the famous "tidelands
litigation," United States v. State of Californ~a, 332 U.S.
19, 39-40, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1669 :
" . . . And even assuming that Government
agencies have been negligent in failing to recognize or assert the claims of the Government at
an earlier date, the great interests of the Government in this ocean area are not to be forfeited as
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a result. The Government, which holds its interests
here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is
not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of
property; and officers who have no authority at
all to dispose of Government property cannot by
their conduct cause the Government to lose its
valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or
failure to act.''
Cf. also Hanks v. Lee, 57 Utah 537, 195 Pac. 302.
The suggestion by respondents that there exists
some distinction between a state acting in a proprietary
rather than governmental capacity, when "disposing" of
property is without warrant. No authority is cited for
such a "hat changing" proposition and none exists. Since
its pronouncement by Judge Thurman in 1921, the Van
Wagoner decision has been and remains the law of Utah
on this iinportant subject. It has signficant implications
in the case at bar. If, as the respondents admit, the State
of Utah owned the school section here involved, then
no unauthorized acts or negligent conduct on the part of its
agents, nor any principle of estoppel or laches, could
preclude the state fr01n asserting its title. Here, the
state officials had authority in 1925 to conv-ey only the
surface rights to the school section involved. By virtue
of an express provision of the rtah law (65-1-15, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953), the 1nineral deposits were reserved to the State of Utah. Any atten1pt by state officials to act contrary to this prohibition would be ineffective to bind the sovereign state with respect to lands held
in its govern1nental capacity.
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POINT II.
WHETHER THE UTAH STATUTES RE:QUIRE A.
RES:ERVATION OF MINERALS.

The State Constitution, Article XX, Section 1,
specifies that state lands held in trust are to be disposed of only "as may be provided by law." It becomes
pertinent, therefore, to inquire as to what law or laws the
state officials purported to act under in entering into
the exchange transaction with respect to the land involved in this case, title to which had vested in the state.
Appellant suggests that Sections 65-1-27, 65-1-70 and
65-1-14 and 65-1-17 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
constitute the only possible grants of authority. It is
further suggested that in view of their terms and history
it is unlikely and illogical to assume that either Section
65-1-27 or Section 65-1-70 is applicable. The authority of
the State Land Board probably stems from Section 651-14 and 65-1-17. Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of appellant's analysis of these four statutes
and regardless of which may contain the necessary
grant of power to enter into an exchange transaction,
Section 65-1-15 constitutes an unqualified reservation
in the state of all mineral deposits, and is a complete
bar to any attempt to alienate such minerals except as
authorized.
In their reply brief, the respondents do not attempt
an analysis of the pertinent statutory provisions, but
simply brush aside the appellant's argument as "tedious
and meticulous detail." Instead, respondents broadly
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assert that Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 are implementary
to the federal statutes, 43 U.S.C. Sections 851 and 852.
It may well be that to some extent Section 65-1-27
is implementary to federal legislation applicable to lieu
selections. But on its face it is clear that Section 65-1-27
has nothing to do with exchanges of vested school sections, since the power of the land board is specifically
limited to relinquishing to the United States tracts of
land erroneously listed to the state and tracts upon which
a bona fide claim had been initiJated by an actual settler.
School section lands, title to which is vested in the state,
are clearly outside both of the specified categories. No
claim is even made by respondents that the subject land
was erroneously listed or that such land was the subject
of a bona fide claim by an actual settler. With respect
to 65-1-70, it is obvious that the exchange therein contemplated is one between the state and a proprietor other
than the United States. At the time of the exchange
transaction involved in this case, 65-1-70 provided that
"no exchange shall be made by the land board until a
patent for the land so received in exchange shall have
been issued by the government of the United States to
such proprietors or their grantors." In the 1933 Revised
Statutes, the phrase "b:r the government of the United
States'' was deleted. Appellant agrees with respondents,
however, that this deletion did not change the sense of
the statute. Plainly. the word "proprietors'' in the present
day version of the statute n1eans someone other than
the United States, just as it did in 1925 and when the
:-;tatute was first enacted in 1897.
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Section 65-1-15 is unqualified in its reservation of
minerals in lands belonging to the state. The first sentence of the statute is all inclusive. It states: "All coal
and other mineral deposited in lands belonging to the
state of Utah are hereby reserved to the state." Respondents contend that this unqualified reservation is limited
by the second sentence of the statute which reads: "Such
deposits are reserved from sale, except on a rental
and royalty basis as herein provided, and the purchaser
of any lands belonging to the state shall acquire no right,
title or interest in or to such deposits, but the rights
of such purchaser shall be subject to the reservation ... "
Respondents argue that the first sentence is limited and
restricted by the second sentence, so that the state's
mineral reservation is applicable only to "sales" in the
strictest sense of that term.
Such a self-defeating construction destroys the
sense and intent of the statute. Do respondents seriously
contend that the legislature meant to create in one sentence an unqualified reservation of minerals in state
owned lands, and in the next sentence restrict the reservation to "sales" in the narrowest sense of that term 1
To do so would defeat the clear intent of the legislature
to create an unqualified mineral reservation in state
owned lands. Respondents cite as authority for their
argument Bird & J ex Company, et al., v. Funk, et al.,
96 Utah 450, 85 P. 2d 831, which deals with the question
of whether a proviso in the Liquor Control Act perrniting advertising of light beer under regulation by the
Commission modified a general prohibition in the Act
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forbidding the advertising of all alcoholic beverages,
including light beer. This Court held that the proviso
had no such modifying effect, and that the general prohibition of the statute remained intact. The citation stands
for exactly the reverse of the proposition for which respondents contend and for which they presumably cite
the case. See also in this connection Dunn v. Bryan, 77
Utah 604, 608, 299 Pac. 253, 254, where this Court rejected
a similar argument, stating :
"We are not impressed with these conclusions,
nor the argument which attempts to sustain it.
In order to determine the meaning of this proviso, we must resort to the ordinary rules of construction, and, when these rules are applied, the
legislative intent is reasonably clear.
" 'It is a cardinal rule of construction that
significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every section, clause, word or part of
the act.'
" 'The several provisions of the statute should
be construed together in the light of the general
purpose and object of the act and so as to give
effect to the 1nain intent and purpose of the
legislature as therein expressed.' ''
In point of fact, the second sentence of Section 65-1-15
is plainly not a proviso, but is supple1nentary to the general mineral re~ervation in the first sentence of the
statute. It declares that the 1nineral deposits reserved
in the t'tate an' subject to transfer on a rental and
royalty basis. Thj~ in no way constitutes a n1odification
of tlw p;<'nPra I 8weep of the mineral reservation set forth
in 1he first sentence.
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As indicated in appellant's initial brief, the word
"sale" in the statute must be read as synonymous with
the word "disposition'' and necessarily includes a reservation of minerals in the disposition or exchange of any
state owned lands. Section 65-1-15 should be construed as
in pari materia with Sections 65-1-14 and 65-1-17. Section 65-1-14 confers broad powers on the State Land
Board to direct, manage, and control all state owned
lands and to "sell" such lands for the best interests of
the state, while Section 65-1-17 states that surface rights
may be "sold" in lands subject to a mineral reservation.
Appellant submits that Sections 65-1-14 and 65-1-17
rather than 65-1-27 or 6·5-1-70 are the particular statutes
which authorize the State Land Board to enter into exchange transactions with the federal government. In
Sections 65-1-14, 65-1-15 and 65-1-17 the words "sell" or
"sale" or "sold" should be read to include an "exchange."
Newton v. State Board of Land Commissioners, et al., 37
Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053; Bridgforth v. Middleton, et al.,
184 Miss. 632, 186 So. 837.
" . . . 'Sale' and 'exchange' are used inter~
changeably in the law, and as a transmutation of
property from one party to another in consideration of some price or recompense in value .... "
Berger v. U.S. Steel Corp., 63 N.J. E. 809, 53 At.
68, 71.
Respondents argue that the House Journal of the
Utah State Legislature for 1919 furnishes support for
its contention that Section 65-1-15 must be strictly
limited to the sale of public lands to private individuals.
A report made by a Special·Committee on Investigation,
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page 469 of the House Journal, discusses auditing irregularities in the State Land Department, and particularly
refers to abuses in the sale of public lands for insufficient consideration. It recommends among other things
that all sales of public land be suspended for five years.
The report contains no discussion nor any suggestion or
recommendation with respect to a mineral reservation
on the part of the state. Aside from the coincidence that
the report and the enactment of Section 65-1-15 were
made in the same year, there appears to be no connection
between the two events. The report sheds no light upon
the intent or meaning of Section 65-1-15.
The appellant has made diligent search to ascertain
the legislative history of Section 65-1-15 in the hope of
finding some materials which might be helpful to a
resolution of the issues in this case. With one exception,
this research has not disclosed anything of value. The
exception is a notation in the 1919 Senate Journal referring to the mineral reservation ~-\_ct. The original bill
was S.B. No. 58 "an act amending Sections 5575 and 5600,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917. and adding new Sections
to be known as 5575, 5575Xl, 5575X2, 5575X3, through
5575X8, relating to the control and management, sales,
leasing, occupying and using of state lands, and the reservations of 1ninerals in state lands and leasing of 1nineral
deposit-8. ete." (Senate Journal 1919, p. 126). On page
267 of the Senate Journal is the following notation:
"Conunittee on Publie Affairs recmnmends
Bill for passage - with certain amendments.
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1. on p. 2 beginning on line 7 strike out the following words: 'except as otherwise expressly
authorized by law.' ''
Although the appellant has not been able to locate
a copy of the original bill, the Session Laws of Utah, 1919,
Chapter 107, page 302, probably sets forth the bill as
finally enacted in approximately the same format as the
original bill. Lines 7 and 8, page 2 of the bill as enacted
and set forth in the Session Laws, contain the first
sentence of the mineral reservation statute reading:
"All coal and other mineral deposits in lands belonging
to the state are hereby reserved to the state." Undoubtedly, the stricken phrase "except as otherwise expressly
authorized by law" was a modifying clause originally inserted at the end of the first sentence of the statute above
quoted. If such were the case, as seems quite certain,
the striking of the phrase "except as otherwise expressly
authorized by law" from the general reservation of all
mineral deposits in the state, makes crystal clear that the
legislature intended no exceptions to or limitations upon
its general reservation.
The respondents argue that there can be no implied
reservation in favor of a grantor of lands. Concededly,
such is the applicable rule with respect to conveyances
between private individuals. The terms of the conveyance
generally control the extent of the grant. But the situation in the case at bar is entirely different. Here certain
officials of the State of Utah purported to convey a state
owned school section to the federal government without
specifying a mineral reservation as expressly required
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by existing state law. Can state officials, without authority so to do, thus convey to another mineral rights in
a school section held in trust by the state in its governmental capacity~ Assume there existed a state statute
stating in precise terms that "the State Land Board is
hereby prohibited from making any exchange of state
owned school sections with the L nited States, without
an express mineral reservation." Under such circumstances, would the respondents argue that in the very
teeth of such a statute, state officials could convey the
fee simple title to designated school sections to the United States~ Under such circumstances would the United
States contend that the State of Ltah had "waived"
its rights to the minerals~ The mere statement of these
queries provides their own answer. Although no statute
as precise as that assumed is set forth in the 17tah laws,
Section 65-1-15 has exactly the same legal effect. It constitutes an express liJ.nitation upon the power of state
officials to act. If the officials attempt to act in derogation of that authorit~-, their action cannot be binding
upon the state.
The provision of -1:3 1J.S.C. §851 that the "selection of
lands in lieu thereof by the state or territory shall be a
waiver of its right to said sections .. 1nay be operative as
far as the federal goYerninent is concerned: it certainly
cannot bind the stah• so as to require a \YaiYer of its
rights when agents of the state aet in derogation of their
statutor~- authority. ~tah• la\\- and state law only can
control thP t<'nns and conditions under which state lands
held in a governmental capacity can be conveyed. State
of California v. neserct TT7ater, Oil & J:rri'[!ation Company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
243 U.S. 415, 37 Sup. Ct. 394; United States v. Burnison,
339 U.S. 87, 70 Sup. Ct. 503. The federal statutes (43
U.S.C. §§ 851 and 852) can be no more than permissive.
Newton v. State Board of Land Commissioners, supra.
Any other view would invade powers expressly reserved
to the State of Utah under the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Respondents cite Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 1927,
and Chapter 144, Laws of Utah, 1957. Both statutes involve an authorization to transfer certain public lands
owned by the state to the federal government, with an
express mineral reservation. According to respondents,
these statutes demonstrate a contemporaneous construction by the legislature of Section 65-1-15, since the
statutes contain an express reservation of minerals and
do not rely upon the general reservation contained in
65-1-15. With equal plausibility, it could be argued that
the statutes emphasize the legislature's fixed intention,
consistent with the policy declared in 65-1-15, to reserve
minerals in the state in connection with the transfer of
any public lands to the United States. The transfer in
1925 of the surface rights to the school section here involved required no special statute in view of Sections
65-1-14 and 65-1-17, but the all inclusive mineral reservation contained in Section 65-1-15 obviously applied.
Moreover, in Laws of Utah, 1937, Chapter 149, an act
authorizing the relinquishment to the United States of
certain lands in Bryce Canyon, it was expressly provided
that the conveyance would include the mineral rights.
On respondents' theory, it could be argued that this indi-
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cates that only when there exists a statute expressly authorizing transfer of minerals to the United States will
the state be deemed to have departed from its established
policy of reserving all mineral deposits.
POINT III.
WHETHER UTAH LAW CONTROLS THE CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT TO BE GIVEN TO UTAH
STATUTES AND THE AUTHORITY OR LACK OF AUTHORITY OF STATE OFFICERS.

A certain amount of confusion has developed in this
case with respect to the specific issues said to be controlled by Utah law. Respondents' brief fails to delineate
these issues :
1. What is the construction and effect to be given
to Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and the earlier enactments from which it was
derived~

2. Was that statute intended to reserve minerals
to the State of Utah in vested school lands in an
exchange with the United States of America1
3. Did the e1nployees and officers of the State of
Utah who entered into the exchange transactions
have authority to convey or waive the minerals
in vested school lands Y
Appellant sub1nits that the foregoing questions are
controlled by Utah state law and that only a decision
by this Court can be finally dispositive thereof.
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No attempt is made by respondents to distinguish or
explain any of the authorities set forth in appellant's
initial brief, except the case of Newton v. State BO'ard
of Land Commissioners) et al.J 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053.
An effort is made to distinguish the Newton case on the
grounds that the State of Idaho had organic provisions
prohibiting exchanges. A careful reading of the Newton
decision will show that it cannot be distinguished on this
ground. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the State
Board of Land ·Commissioners lacked authority under
Section 5 of the Idaho Admission Bill and under Section
8, Article IX of the Idaho Constitution to effect the contemplated exchange. It obviously makes no difference
whether the prohibition is contained in the state constitution or in state statutes. If the prohibition exists, the
agents and officers of the state lack authority to effect
an exchange. The Newton case was commenced in the
Supreme Court of Idaho to prohibit the State Board of
Land Commissioners from making an exchange of school
lands with the United States. Petitioner alleged that the
State Board lacked authority under state law to effect
such an exchange on the terms proposed. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that the question was one of state
law and that such authority did not exist. In so holding,
the court carefully reviewed and considered California
v. Deseret Water) Oil and Irrigation Company) 243 U.S.
415, 37 Sup. Ct. 394, characterizing that decision as follows:
" ... But as we understand the decision, the
Federal Supreme Court expressly disavows any
purpose to decide for the state when and under
what circumstances it has authority under its Con-
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stitution and laws to surrender such school lands,
which is the question before us for determination.
* :JI: *"
Other portions of the Newton opinion are set forth in
appellant's prior brief.
In adition to the authorities previously cited, the
following additional citations hold that state law is controlling with respect to land litigation:

Brine v. Insurance Company, 96 e.S. 627, 24 L.E.
858
Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat 577
McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall23
Johanson v. W ashi11gton, 190 U.S. 179, 23 Sup. Ct.
825
Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557
Tyler v. Uni,ted States, 281 r.S. 497. 50 Sup. Ct.
356
United States v. Burnison, 339li.S. 87,70 Sup. Ct.
503
United States v. E. H. Kramel, et al., :234 F. 2d 577
(8th Cir. 1956)
Hidalgo County TFater Control and lmprorement
District No. 7, et al. v. Wyatt C. Hedrick, et al.,
226 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1955)
Humble Oil and Refining Company v. Sun Oil
Company, 190 F. :2d 191 (5th Cir. 1951)
Respondents argue that "the applicable federal legislation" controls to the t•xelusion of state statutes. No
identification is 1nade of the particular federal statutes
deemed applieable. It would appear. however, from the
discut-'Hion at page 1:2 of respondents' brief that their con-
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tention is that Section 851, Title 43, United States Code,.
controls to the exclusion of state law. Followed to its
logic conclusion, respondents' argument is that Section
851, Title 43 operates to provide that the action of stat~
officers, in making a selection, constitutes a waiver of
state's rights, notwithstanding lack of authority under
state statutes.
This contention is a far-reaching proposition which
cannot withstand analysis. As evidenced by the numerous
authorities cited by appellant, the Congress of the United
States has no authority to legislate with respect to when
and under what circumstances a state, acting in its governmental capacity, may waive its rights in real property.
Congress has no power to vest authority in state officers
and employees to perform acts which are not authorized
under state law. There is no provision in the Constitution
of the United States granting such powers to Congress.
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States expressly provides that all powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited
by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively
or to the people. It is this basic constitutional concept
which through the years has brought about a consistent
determination by federal and state courts that questions
such as those involved in this action are controlled by
state law.
The statement is made by respondents at page 17
of their brief that the executive and legislative officers
of the State of Utah at no time material to these procedings believed that implementing and consensual legis-
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lation ·was not in existence~ Except for· the ommission of
any mention of a mineral reservation in the Selection
Lists, there is not a single shred of evidence in this case
which would indicate that any officer of the State of Utah
intended to convey the mineral rights in the subject
lands to the United States. Even if such an erroneous
belief had been held by an officer of the State, such a
belief, if in fact contrary to the provisions of the Utah
statutes, could have no binding effect upon the State of
Utah.

Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 71 Sup. Ct. 557, cited at
page 18, of respondents' brief is not in point. That case
involved an interstate compact between eight states to
control polution in the Ohio River system. The compact
required congressional consent, and direct participation
by the federal government was provided by the President's appointment of three 1nembers of the compact commission. The Ohio River is an interstate stream which
directly affects interstate conrmerce. The Constitution
of the United States expressly provides in Article 1,
Section 8, that Congress shall have power to regulate
commerce among the several states. ~\rticle 1, Section
10 of the Constitution of the United States provides that
no state shall; without the consent of Congress, enter
into any agreement or emnpact with another state. The
<~ontrolling effect given to federal law in Dyer v. Sims
was obviously predicated upon the foregoing consideration~. But application of federalla.w to a 1nultistate compact concerning an interstate strean1 is an entirely differPut matter from deter1nining the law applicable to land
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transactions within a state. As recognized by Justice
Reed in his concurring opinion, at page 32 and 33, 341

u.s. 22:
" ... This Court must accept the State court's
interpretation of its own Constitution unless it is
prepared to say that the interpretation is a palpable evasion to avoid a federal rule."
POINT IV.
WHETHER E:X:CHANGE8 NEED NOT BE OF
EQUIVALENT ESTATES BUT ONLY OF EQUIVALENT
VALUES.

Respondents' argument under this point assumes
two propositions:
1. That federal exchanges must be of equivalent

estates and that an exchange of equivalent estates
was lacking in the subject transaction; and,
2. That if an exchange of equivalent estates was
required, then the mineral rights in the subject
lands passed from the State of Utah to the
United States of America.
Neither of these propositions is a correct statement
of the law. There is no provision in Section 851, Title 43,
United States Code, which requires that the exchange be
one of equivalent estates, nor is there any express provision contained in that statute which requires a conveyance by a state of mineral rights in lands the title to
which already has vested in a state. Furthermore, it is
significant that not a single decision or statute has been
cited by respondents for the proposition that a state can-
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not reserve minerals in making an exchange. The Regulations of the Department of Interior relating to
exchanges under Section 851 (Code of Federal Regulations, Section 270.3, Title 43), provides only that the
lands selected correspond in area with the base tract.
Although the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S.
489, 41 Sup. Ct. 393, suggests that the Act contemplates an
exchange of equivalents, it does not hold that the exchange must be one of equivalent estates.
The entire statutory and regulatory scheme of Congress and the Department of the Interior, as the same
pertains to exchanges of land by the United States, contemplates an exchange of equivalent values, not an exchange of equivalent estates. A reading of the various
exchange statutes of the United States and the Regulations of the Department of the Interior promulgated pursuant thereto makes evident that the general practice
in exchanges of all types has been to look to the value
of the interests exchanged, rather than to equivalent estates.
In that connection, it is interesting to note the situation \Vith respect to particular exchanges covered by the
federal statutes and regulations.
Provision was 1nade in the Aet of June S. 1934, 48
Stat. 272, popularly known as the Taylor Grazing Act,
for the exchange of land by the United States with private proprietors and "·ith the states. The statute itself
provides that either party 1nay reserve 1nineral rights,
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easements or other rights of use. The regulations (Section
146.2 and 147.4, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43)
provide simply that the exchange must be of equivalent
values.
Provision was made in the Act of March 20, 1922,
42 Stat. 465, 16 U.S.C. 485, for exchanges of land with
the United States of America for the consolidation or extension of national forests. The Act expressly provides
that mineral rights can be reserved by either party. The
Regulations of the Department of Interior (Section 148.5,
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43) provide that
the exchange be of equivalent values.
The Act of June 15, 1926, 44 Stat. 746, provides for
exchanges by the United States with the State of New
Mexico to obtain lands for national forests. This statute
expressly permits reservation of mineral, timber or
easements. The Regulations of the Department Interior
(Section 148.23, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43)
require that the value of selected lands shall not exceed
the value of offered lands, taking into account any
reservations.
Each of the other exchange statutes and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, contemplates
an exchange, not of equivalent estates, but of equivalent
values. It is apparent, therefore, that there is no provision
of federal law which requires an exchange of equivalent
estates.
Respondents' argument assumes that if an exchange
of equivalent estates was required under federal statute,
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that in that event the minerals passed out of the State of
Utah, notwithstanding any prohibition contained in the
Utah statutes. Even assuming that the federal laws
required an exchange of equivalent estates, such a requirement would provide no authority under state law
for a conveyance of the mineral rights in vested school
lands.
Respondents concede on page 20 of their brief that
the federal government followed a consistent practice
in connection with exchanges under Section 851, Title
43, of either reserving the mineral rights in selected lands
or determining in advance of the approval of exchanges
that the selected lands had no mineral value. If federal
law required an exchange of equivalents, how can the
respondents justify the practice followed by the federal
governn1ent over the years f How can the exchanges
be "of equivalents" if the United States either reserved
the minerals or gave up land having no mineral value,
unless "equivalents" refers to approximate values rather
than estates.
It is significant to note that in exchanges under
Section 851, Title 43, between the State of Utah and the
United States pertaining to lands which were included
in the addition to the Navajo Indian Reservation after
May 12, 1919, approval was given by the United States
of Amer:iea to approxin1atel~· 31 separate approved lists.
Of said 31 approved lists there were 9 lists in which either
all or part of the selected or lieu lands were exchanged
with express reservation in the United States of America .
of tnineral rights. In all instances where an express
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reserva ton of minerals was not made by the United
States with respect to the lieu lands, a determination
was made prior to the exchange that the lands had
no mineral value. If respondents' contentions are correct,
the State of Utah in many instances gave up its rights
to the minerals in the school lands included in said exchanges and, in turn, received lieu lands which were either
determined to have no mineral value or in which the
United States expressly reserved such minerals.
POINT V.
WHETHER A RULE OF PROPERTY CAN BE
EVOLVED FROM PRIOR EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS.

Appellant recognizes that there have been a large
number of exchange transactions between the State of
Utah and the federal government. Although the record
in this case is silent as to the number of acres of land
involved in such transactions, the number does not even
closely approximate the 1,000,000 acres suggested by
respondents. Furthermore, respondents have referred to
transactions involving all of the different types of exchanges which have been entered into by the State of
Utah. It is of no assistance in this case to look to transactions of an unlike character.
The great bulk of the exchanges referred to by respondents relate to lands where title had not vested in
the State of Utah. Appellant concedes that the minerals
were not reserved in lands where title had not vested
in the State prior to the exchange. The mineral reservation contained in Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated,
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1953, relates only to lands owned by or belonging to the
State of Utah. Transactions involving lands which never
vested have no significance. It is also important to determine what part of the exchanges involving vested
lands occurred after the effective date of Section 65-1-15.
Obviously there was no statutory prohibition against
a conveyance of the mineral rights prior to the effective
date of May 12, 1919. If such a classification of exchanges
were made, it is probable that there would not be found
many instances where the precise type of exchange involved in this action has occurred. It is safe to say that
the number would not approach anywhere near the dimensions indicated by respondents.
Respondents do not suggest what rule of property
is to be evolved from the exchange transactions, although
the reference on page 22 of their brief indicates that the
rule of property proposed is the "equivalent estate
principle." As hereinabove demonstrated, no such rule
exists.
The suggestion is n1ade that an estoppel may arise
against the State of lTtah out of said transactions, even
though the state acted in its govermnental capacit~~ where
necessary to prevent loss and the perpetration of a fraud
and such estoppel would not in1pair tl1e exercise of
sovereign power. This broad statenwnt is n1eaningless
in the eontext of the facts of this case. ~-\.ppellant has
<dread~· di~enssed the law relating to estoppel. It is respectfully ~ubmitted that this Court n1ust disregard its
prior decisions in order to adopt an estoppel theory in
this ea.~P. Apart from that consideration, there certainly
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is no evidence of fraud in this case, and the application
of an estoppel theory here would clearly impair the exercise of the state's sovereign powers.
Even if a theory of estoppel were applicable, it
would be necessary for respondents to show proof of the
elements of an estoppel. Such proof is entirely lacking
in this case. Respondents do not even suggest the type
of estoppel claimed, whether estoppel by record, estoppel
by deed or estoppel by matter in pais. The failure of respondents to offer any evidence or proof of the elements
of an estoppel or to treat the subject in an analytical
legal fashion by suggesting the type of estoppel and the
elements thereof, suggests that their argument is not
made with any serious conviction.
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CONCLUSION
The respondents' brief fails to meet or answer the
arguments set forth in appellant's opening brief. Appellant submits that, in fact, there is no logical answer to
the arguments which support the position of the State of
Utah. For this reason, this Court respectfully is asked
to reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment for the appellant quieting the title of the State of
Utah to the mineral deposits in the lands here involved.
Respectfully,
E. R. oCALLISTER, JR.,
Attorney General,
State of Utah
DENNIS McCARTHY,
Special Assistant

Counsel for Appellant
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